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Abstract
We develop a simple model of generous behavior. It is based on the
premise that some people are generous, but everyone wants to appear
generous. Although non-monetary donations are always ineﬃcient, our
model predicts donors to favor non-monetary donations when the in-
eﬃciency is relatively small and when the recipient is suﬃciently rich.
The model helps to explain the prevalence of volunteering, the nature of
Christmas gifts, and the taboo against paying cash in return for friendly
favors. The model also explains why it is socially more acceptable to
ask for favors than for money.
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11I n troduction
Why is it sometimes acceptable to ask colleagues, friends and neighbors to help
out with a removal, getting amateur service from people who never contem-
plated entering the removal business, but unacceptable to ask the very same
people to sponsor a professional removal? And why do people volunteer for
charitable causes even when it would generate larger beneﬁts for the recipients
if the donor spent the hours at work and donated the wage? Conventional eco-
nomic thinking suggests that these practices are plainly ineﬃcient and should
not exist.
The same is true for Christmas gifts. Waldfogel (1993, 2002) ﬁnds that
a conventionally computed deadweight loss of Christmas is sizeable. Donors
sometimes buy suboptimal presents, the average eﬃciency loss being estimated
at about ten percent of the purchase price. In addition, donors spend valuable
time and eﬀort in order to ﬁnd an optimal present.1
Like Mauss (1925) and Titmuss (1971) we believe that volunteering, help,
and gifts are due to values and norms that encourage donations of time and
eﬀort, but not necessarily of money. The challenge is to understand why these
seemingly ineﬃcient norms emerge.
We suggest that the main reason for non–monetary generosity is that people
give not only in order to beneﬁt the recipient but also in order to appear
generous in the eyes of the recipient or other observers. As Becker (1974)
noted in his seminal article on altruistic behavior, much generosity is displayed
because people care about esteem.2 Although a non–monetary gift is less
valuable to the recipient, it may nonetheless be a cost–eﬀective way for the
donor to signal altruism and attain the associated esteem. The argument runs
as follows. If it is valuable for the altruist to be recognized as such, donations
serve as signals and will be distorted upwards relative to the full information
benchmark. A reduction in this distortion would be valuable to the donor.
We assume, realistically, that altruistic donors have a comparative advantage
in making non–monetary donations. For example, although most people may
ﬁnd it onerous to buy Christmas presents or to help out with removals, the
eﬀort cost is smaller for altruistic donors than for egoistic donors. Hence, the
1Solnick and Hemenway (1996) and List and Shogren (1998) have found that recipients
often attach a material value to gifts that exceed the gifts’ cost, hence questioning our
premise that non–monetary gifts are ineﬃcient. Waldfogel (1998) argues that the anomaly
might be due to the sizeable diﬀerence between people’s willingness to accept (WTA) and
their willingness to pay (WTP).
2We have chosen to use the word “esteem” because it has been carefully deﬁned by
Brennan and Pettit (2004). However, words like approval, prestige, and respect have almost
exactly the same meaning.
2non–monetary donation necessary to distiguish oneself as an altruist is smaller
than the corresponding monetary donation.
Here are four of the predictions that emerge from our model. First, non–
monetary donations are symbolic. When altruism is suﬃciently strong, the
transfer motive dominates, and donations are monetary. Second, because the
transfer motive always plays some role, non–monetary gifts are more likely
when they are relatively eﬃcient. Third, even if eﬃciency is desirable as such,
large acquisition costs may be justiﬁed as long as altruistic donors have smaller
acquisition costs than egoistic donors. Ineﬃciencies associated with personal-
ization of the gift are thus often acceptable. Fourth, whenever altruistic re-
cipients have a comparative advantage in receiving non–monetary favors, it is
socially more acceptable to ask for non–monetary favors than for monetary
ones. In particular, requests for assistance are more legitimate when execution
of the favor requires recipient presence. It is more legitimate to ask a colleague
to help out with a problem in one’s presence than in one’s absence.
The idea that people seek esteem is accepted by social psychologists and
economists alike.3 Even self–esteem is heavily aﬀected by others’ opinions.
As Veblen (1934, p.30) put it: “the usual basis for self–respect is the respect
accorded by one’s neighbors”. For evidence that desire for social approval is
important for charitable giving, see for example Schwartz (1967), Satow (1975),
Harbaugh (1998a,b) and Andreoni and Petrie (2004), Soetevent (2005), Dana,
Cain, and Dawes (2006), and Broberg, Ellingsen, and Johannesson (2007).4
Nelson and Greene (2003) is a booklength discussion of people’s desire to signal
their goodness and the consequences of this desire for social organization.
The notion that money makes it too easy to fake regard, and that person-
alized gifts are therefore more credible, has been discussed by Zelitzer (1994),
Carrier (1995), and Oﬀer (1997) among others. Robben and Verhallen (1994)
report that recipients signiﬁcantly prefer gifts that are costly in terms of time
3Fort ypical views on approval in anthropology and sociology, see Homans (1961), Cole-
man (1990, 129–131), and Wright (1994). Becker (1974) mentions several classical references,
as does Oﬀer (1997). For a more comprehensive literature review covering all social sciences,
see Brennan and Pettit (2004). Here, we would just like to reiterate Adam Smith’s thought-
ful passage: “What is the end of avarice and ambition, of the pursuit of wealth, of power,
and preheminece? Is it to supply the necessities of nature? The wages of the meanest
labourer can supply them ... what are the advantages which we propose to gain by that
great purpose of life which we call bettering the human condition? To be observed, to be
attended to, to be taken notice of with sympathy, complacency and approbation, are all the
advantages which we can propose to derive from it.” (Smith, 1753, Ch. ii. 1).
4A recent ﬁeld study by Landry et al. (2006) ﬁnds that the beauty of female solicitors
is strongly positively related to charitable giving. We think that the social approval motive
oﬀers a plausible explanation.
3and eﬀort rather than money. This ﬁnding squares well with the regard sig-
naling hypothesis, at least if we think that recipients appreciate learning that
the donor is altruistic towards them. Lee, Piliavin, and Call (1999) explicitly
compare people’s motivation for giving time, money, and blood. Volunteering
of time is more strongly aﬀected by others’ expectations than are donations of
blood and of money.5
In Andreoni’s (1989) model of pure and impure alruism, the opinions of
others play no explicit role. The donor’s “warm glow” (impure altruism) could
be linked to what others think, but formally the warm glow is simply assumed
to be more or less proportional to the gift. While this reduced form model
is very useful in many applications, it does not explain why people give in
ineﬃcient ways. Explicit signaling models of gift giving have been proposed by
Camerer (1988), Glazer and Konrad (1996), Carmichael and MacLeod (1997),
Denrell (1998), Prendergast and Stole (2001), B´ enabou and Tirole (2006),
Ellingsen and Johannesson (2006a) and Andreoni and Bernheim (2006). In
all of these, gifts are used to credibly communicate information about the
donor’s type. Camerer (1988) and Prendergast and Stole (2001) are most
closely related to our work, as both provide reasons for the existence of non–
monetary gifts. Camerer’s main story is nonetheless quite diﬀerent from ours.
In his model, ineﬃcient gifts are given only because gift giving is bilateral.
Gifts with a low user value prevent people from entering relationships in order
to collect gifts. In our model, gift giving is unilateral, and non–monetary gifts
are chosen despite their ineﬃciency, because they are harder to mimick by
insincere donors.
Like the present paper, Prendergast and Stole (2001) ﬁnd that non–monetary
gifts ought to be more common when the eﬃciency loss is small and when the
donor’s altruism is not too large. However, a crucial feature of their model is
that altruistic donors have superior knowledge of the recipient’s preferences.
Therefore, their model is applicable only when the recipient’s desires are not
too well known. Our model applies even when the recipient’s preferences are
common knowledge; we can explain why an acquaintance can ask for help with
a removal, but cannot ask for money without sacriﬁcing esteem. In fact, our
model even allows the recipient’s beneﬁt to be monetary, thereby explaining
volunteering for charities and generosity in the workplace. Admitting mone-
tary beneﬁts also distinguishes our work from other theories of non–monetary
5Relatedly, Ellingsen and Johannesson (2006b) ﬁnd that people appear more likely to
classify a social situation as one in which gift giving is appropriate when they have the
opportunity only to give time than when they have the opportunity only to give money. In
the present paper, we do not discuss why some situations are construed as suitable for gift
giving and others are not.
4gifts, including those focusing on donor paternalism (Pollack, 1988), recipient
screening (Blackorby and Donaldson, 1988), and donor commitment (Bruce
and Waldman, 1991).
2M o del
A donor is endowed with ωD units of cash and ¯ t units of time. Time is either
spent working, earning a wage of 1 per unit of time, or it is spent helping a
recipient. Money buys a single consumption good at a price of 1 per unit. The
donor can also transfer money to the recipient. For simplicity, the recipient
is assumed not to work and not to help anyone. Thus, the recipient merely
consumes an endowment ωR in addition to any transfers from the donor.
The donor cares both about own consumption cD and the recipient’s con-
sumption cR. The donor can be either altruistic or egoistic; the diﬀerence is
that the altruistic donor values the recipient’s consumption more. Let ˆ h de-
note the recipient’s subjective probability that the donor is altruistic. Besides
caring about consumption, the donor would like the recipient, or some other
observer, to believe that the donor is altruistic. The donor cannot avoid being
observed.
Gifts can be either monetary or non–monetary, and of any size. Mixtures of
monetary and non–monetary gifts are ruled out for simplicity; allowing mixed
gifts does not substantially alter the analysis.6 We measure the donor’s cost
of giving in consumption units, and we also assume that the recipient always
receives gifts in the form of increased consumption. While a non–monetary gift
may have additional nonmonetary costs or beneﬁts to the recipient, we shall
mostly neglect these.7 The cost to the donor of a monetary gift is denoted gm,
and the cost of a non–monetary gift is denoted gt. The recipient’s consumption
increases by gm and γgt respectively. Thus, if γ<1, the donor is less eﬃcient
at helping than at working. Relative to working, the donor also obtains some
dissatisfaction from the helping activity itself.8
Formally, the donor’s utility function is assumed to be additively separable
and to consist of four parts: (i) the donor’s utility of of own consumption,
d(cD); (ii) the donor’s utilty of the recipient’s consumption αDr(cR); (iii) the
6When allowed, mixed gifts are only rarely optimal, and all major results continue to
hold.
7Non–monetary costs and beneﬁts to the recipient only play a role in Section ??.
8Clearly, one reason for giving time instead of money could be that the donor strongly
likes the helping activity. To avoid this trivial explanation for generosity in the time domain,
we assume that the donor prefers working to helping (for given consumption levels).
5donor’s disutility of giving time, e(αD)f(gt); (iv) the donor’s pride p(ˆ αD),
where ˆ αD is the recipient’s expectation of αD.W erefer to ˆ αD as the donor’s
esteem and p(ˆ αD)a sthe donor’s pride. To summarize, the donor’s utility is
ui = d(cD)+αir(cR) − e(αi)f(g
t)+p(ˆ α), (1)
where i ∈{ H,L} and αH >α L. We assume that d and r are increasing
and concave functions, with limcD→0 d (cD)=∞ and limcR→∞ r (cR)=0 .
We assume that f is increasing, with f(0) = 0, and that e is positive and
decreasing. We say that the donor is altruistic if αD = αH and egoistic if
αD = αL. We further assume that ui is continuous and diﬀerentiable in all its
arguments, and make the normalization that p(αL)=0 .91 0
We refer to d(cD)a sthe donor’s consumption utility,t oαir(cR)a sthe
donor’s compassion utility, and to e(αi)f(gt)a sthe donor’s eﬀort cost (or
more generally the cost of intimacy). To the extent that the recipient must
also exert eﬀort when receiving a time gift, we assume that the donor neglects
this cost. The analysis is similar if the donor’s altruism extends also to the
recipient’s eﬀort costs. Note that donors diﬀer only in their compassion utility
and in their eﬀort cost; for a given level of esteem, their pride is assumed to
be the same. This assumption is innocuous, but simpliﬁes the exposition.
For simplicity, we also restrict attention to the case where altruism is so
modest that
d
 (ωD + ¯ t) − αHr
 (wR) > 0. (2)
Under this restriction, no donor would give anything were it not for the pride.
Observe that the situation is essentially a signaling game. The donor’s
strategy is a gift g =( gm,gt) ∈{ 0}×R+ ∪ R+ ×{ 0}.U pon observing the
gift g the recipient forms a belief ˆ α concerning the donor’s expected altruism.
Although we abstract from any subsequent actions, the fact that the donor
cares about the recipient’s belief will generate all the strategic interactions
that are typical of signaling games.
Form uch of the analysis the choice of solution concept is relatively unim-
portant, because only separating equilibria are of interest. Among separating
equilibria, popular reﬁnements tend to pick the outcome that yields the highest
donor utility: the best separating equilibrium. Notably, the commonly used
Intuitive Criterion of Cho and Kreps (1987) has enough power to pick this
9Note that this normalization would turn into a restrictive assumption if the donor could
avoid being evaluated along the altruism dimension altogether.
10The formulation (??) suggests that the donor does not care about the recipient’s type.
Arguably, people are more altruistic towards other altruists, as suggested by Levine (1998).
However, such an extension is largely irrelevant for our analysis.
6outcome in our model. (In Section 4, we will discuss some issues that demand
a richer model and probably a diﬀerent solution concept.)
Our key assumption is that the cost of giving time, the eﬀort cost, is smaller
for altruists than for egoists: e(αH)f(gt) <e (αL)f(gt) for all gt > 0. The
justiﬁcation is that the altruistic donor cares for the recipient, and hence ﬁnds
it less painful to spend time thinking about or interacting with him or her.
Buying a present for one we truly love, and helping one we truly like can
be almost pleasurable. Precisely therefore, these activities are ﬁne signals.
As Camerer (1988, p.S195) points out: “Any net cost of time, energy, or
imagination is part of the signaling cost of a gift: the thought does count.”
3 Analysis
Before analyzing the full game, it proves useful to analyse the “restricted”
games in which the donor cannot choose the nature of the gift, only its size.
3.1 Monetary gifts
Suppose the donor is conﬁned to give a purely monetary gift. With gm ∈ R+
and gt ≡ 0, we can write donor utility as
u
m




Without concern for esteem, the donor would set gm to maximize d(ωD + ¯ t −
gm)+αr(wR + gm). The optimal value of the gift, call it gm
∗ (α), would then
be given by the ﬁrst–order condition
αr
 (wR + g
m
∗ (α)) − d
 (ωD + ¯ t − g
m
∗ (α)) ≤ 0, (3)
with equality if gm
∗ > 0. By assumption (??), it follows that gm
∗ =0 . Thus,
the donor gives nothing unless there is esteem to be had from giving.
Let us now derive the Intuitive equilibrium outome(s). Since the utility




and the set of feasible gifts is unbounded, the model has one and only one
Intuitive equilibrium outcome in the sense of Cho and Kreps (1987), and this is
the “best separating equilibrium.” The Intuitive outcome thus has the feature
that the altruistic donor gives a gift just large enough for the egoistic donor to
reveal himself by not giving. More formally, the altruist’s gift satisﬁes exactly
7the “upward” incentive constraint
d(ωD + ¯ t)+αLr(ωR) ≥ d(ωD + ¯ t − g
m)+αLr(ωR + g
m)+p(αH).
Rearranging terms, we see that the altruist’s gift gm
S is given by
d(ωD + ¯ t) − d(ωD + ¯ t − g
m
S )=αL[r(ωR + g
m
S ) − r(ωR)] + p(αH). (4)
The left hand side is the reduction of consumption utility brought about by the
gift, and the right hand side is the associated increase in compassion utility (for
the egoist) and pride. In equilibrium, an egoistic donor refrains from giving,
because any gift below gm
S makes the recipient, or other observers, infer that
the donor is egoistic, and with no gain in esteem the egoistic donor never gives.
Lemma 1 If the donor is conﬁned to giving money, the unique Intuitive equi-
librium outcome has the property that an altruistic donor gives gm
S and an
egoistic donor gives nothing.
While the equilibrium gift gm
S is positive and thus larger than the altruist
would ideally have wanted, the price is worth paying in order to earn esteem.
Since the altruist’s opportunity cost of giving is smaller than the egoist’s, there
always exists a gift gm
S that is small enough not to completely dissipate the
utility of esteem and large enough to keep the egoist from pretending altruism.
It is often claimed that generous behavior cannot be driven entirely by the
esteem motive; see Brennan and Pettit (2004, pages 36–46) for a recent dis-
cussion. The argument is that observers only value true generosity, and hence
will not appreciate actions that are taken exclusively in order to gain esteem.
As Elster (1983, page 66) puts it: “Nothing is so unimpressive as behavior
designed to impress.” Signaling models such as ours oﬀer a straightforward
resolution: Even if pure altruism is insuﬃcient to generate any generous be-
havior, the combination of true altruism and quest for esteem can be suﬃcient
–e ven when the latter prestige motive is perfectly understood by all. The
reason is that while the diﬀerences in true altruism are too small to generate
diﬀerential behavior in and of themselves (because altruism is too weak to
generate positive donations), the diﬀerences in altruism will be apparent once
the prestige motive is added. Just as an addition of noise can amplify weak
sounds to a level where they can be perceived, the prestige motive can amplify
altruism to a level where diﬀerences in altruism create perceptible diﬀerences
in behavior. The generous behavior is designed exclusively to impress, yet it
succeeds in doing so.
Our next step is to consider gifts of time instead of money. Before doing so,
it is useful to deﬁne “donation reward” as the net contribution to donor utility
from giving a positive gift. Observe that the entire donation reward can here
8be ascribed to the presence of esteem. Since the altruist would not have given
anything absent the desire for esteem, it is also clear that the donation reward
must be smaller than p(αH). To be precise, the equilibrium reward obtained
by the altruist under a purely monetary donation is
π
m = d(ωD + ¯ t − g
m
S )+αHr(ωR + g
m
S )+p(αH) − d(ωD + ¯ t) − αHr(ωR)
=( αH − αL)[r(ωR + g
m
S ) − r(ωR)],
where the second equality follows from (??). That is, the altruistic donor
attains a reward that is equal to the compassion utility brought about by the
gift minus the compassion utility that an egoist would have felt giving the
same gift.
Observation 1 With purely monetary gifts, the altruist’s equilibrium dona-
tion reward equals the compassion utility diﬀerential associated with the small-
est separating gift.
3.2 Time gifts
Let us next consider the case in which the donor gives time but not money.
The donor’s utility function can now be written as
u
t





Giving the recipient γgt units of consumption costs the donor d(ωD + ¯ t) −
d(ωD + ¯ t − gt)+e(αi)f(gt). The cost is higher than before both because the
gift is ineﬃcient (γ<1) and because of the eﬀort cost e(α)f(gt).
Note that the donor would not give a time gift if there were no esteem
beneﬁt. This follows from the assumption embodied in (??) and the fact that
time gifts come with additional costs and no additional beneﬁts.
As above, the Intuitive equilibrium outcome entails a gift by the altruist
that precisely satisﬁes the egoist’s incentive constraint




The crucial observation here is that the egoist wanting to mimick altruism
faces an additional cost, namely the eﬀort cost e(αL)f(gt). Rearranging terms,









Again, the egoistic donor gives nothing in equilibrium.
9Lemma 2 If the donor is conﬁned to giving time, the unique Intuitive equilib-
rium outcome has the property that an altruistic donor gives gt
S and an egoistic
donor gives nothing.
The level comparison between gt
S and gm
S is straightforward.
Observation 2 Ceteris paribus, the material opportunity cost of non-monetary
gifts, gt
S,i ssmaller than that of monetary gifts, gm
S .
Comparing (??)t o( ??)w esee that the diﬀerence has two separate causes.
Non-monetary gifts are smaller both because they yield less utility to the
recipient (γ<1) and because they are more costly to provide (e(αL)f(gt
S) > 0).
Since the choice of gift will depend on parameters, this observation by itself is
not very helpful, however.
The altruist’s donation reward from giving a non–monetary gift is
π







−d(ωD + ¯ t) − αHr(ωR)
=( αH − αL)[r(ωR + γg
t
S) − r(ωR)] + [e(αL) − e(αH)]f(g
t
S),
where the second equality follows from (??).
Observation 3 With purely non–monetary gifts, the altruist’s equilibrium do-
nation reward equals the sum of the compassion utility diﬀerential and the eﬀort
cost diﬀerential associated with the smallest separating gift.
3.3 Money or time?
Having computed the equilibria of the two restricted games, we are ready to
analyze the full game. Being able to choose the nature of the gift as well as
its size, what will the donor do? As before, the Intuitive Criterion selects the
best separating equilibrium.
Observation 4 The donor gives money if πm >π t and time if πt >π m.
The proof is straightforward, so we only sketch it. Suppose that the best sepa-
rating money gift equilibrium yields a higher altruistic donor reward than the
best separating time gift equilibrium. The question is whether the availability
of time gifts destroys the equilibrium. The answer is negative for the following
reason: The equilibrium could only disappear (fail the Intuitive Criterion) if
there were a time gift gt with the property that (i) gt yields a higher reward
to the altruist and (ii) gt does not yield a higher reward to the egoist. But
if such a time gift existed, then it would have induced a separating equilib-
rium in the restricted game with time gifts only, contradicting the assumption
10that πm >π t. Suppose instead that the best separating money gift equilib-
rium yields a smaller altruistic donor reward than the best separating time gift
equilibrium. Then, the money gift equilibrium does not satisfy the Intuitive
Criterion, because the altruistic donor can defect and give time gt
S + , where  
is a small positive amount. This defection can never be rational for an egoist,
so the recipient should infer that the gift is given by an altruist, whence the
defection pays oﬀ.
All that remains is to investigate how the various parameters of the model
aﬀects ∆ = πt−πm, the altruist’s advantage from giving non–monetary rather
than monetary gifts. The advantage can be written
∆=( αH − αL)[r(ωR + γg
t
S) − r(ωR + g
m
S )]+[ e(αL) − e(αH)]f(g
t
S). (6)
Depending on the parameters, ∆ can be either positive or negative. If altruism
αH is small (large) relative to the cost diﬀerence e(αL) − e(αH), ∆ is positive
(negative) and time (money) gifts are preferred. The eﬃciency of the time gift
also matters.
Proposition 1 In the Intuitive equilibrium, the likelihood of non–monetary
gifts is non–decreasing in the eﬃciency parameter γ.
Proof: Diﬀerentiate with respect to γ in equation (??). From (??)w es e e
that gm
S is independent of γ, whereas from (??)w esee that gt
S is increasing in
γ. Hence, ∆ is increasing in γ. 
Although the result borders on the trivial, and is closely reminiscent of Pren-
dergast and Stole (2001), we emphasize it for three reasons. First, it stands in
stark contrast to the result of Camerer (1988), where the whole point of non–
monetary gifts is their ineﬃciency. Second, the result is general, in the sense
that it does not rest on restrictive assumptions concerning functional forms.
Third, the result seems to ﬁt the empirical evidence on gift giving. Notably,
Waldfogel (2002) reports that cash gifts are more often given by donors who
tend to give unwanted gifts.
Next, consider the eﬀect of an increase in the recipient’s wealth, ωR.
Proposition 2 There exists a ﬁnite level of recipient wealth ˆ ωR such that the
equilibrium gift is non–monetary for all ωR > ˆ ωR.
Proof: Since gifts are bounded above by the (monetary equivalent of the)
value of esteem, and limωR→∞ r (ωR)=0 ,the diﬀerence r(ωR +γgt
S)−r(ωR +
gm
S )g oest ozero as wR goes to inﬁnity. Since gt
S remains well above 0 (by
inspection of equation (??)) even in this limit, it follows from (??) that ∆ > 0
in the limit. By continuity, ∆ is also positive for all levels of recipient wealth
above some ﬁnitely large ωR. 
11The intuition is that the donor’s concern for increasing the recipient’s consump-
tion becomes unimportant, relative to acquiring esteem, as the recipient gets
suﬃciently rich. As the concern for the recipient’s consumption diminishes, so
does the size of the gift. Accordingly, the donor becomes less concerned about
the eﬃciency of the donation, preferring instead to make a non–monetary do-
nation in order to maximize the esteem rent. There is just no point in giving
money to a very rich person.11
An increase in the donor’s wealth does not have a determinate eﬀect on
the nature of the gift. On the one hand, the eﬃciency loss associated with
switching from money gifts to time gifts is magniﬁed as the donor gets richer
and donates more. On the other hand, as the separating equilibrium gift gets
larger, so does the eﬀort cost diﬀerential. Depending on functional forms,
either the compassion utility diﬀerential or the eﬀort cost diﬀerential may
increase more as the donor gets richer. A similar argument shows that an
increase in the donor’s valuation of esteem has an ambiguous eﬀect on the
nature of the gift.
4 Asking for help
So far, we have assumed that the donor has all the initiative. Suppose now
instead that the recipient identiﬁes the opportunity for social exchange. To be
speciﬁc, consider the removal example that we discussed in the ﬁrst sentence
of the Introduction. A person (potential recipient) decides to move and he
contemplates asking an acquaintance (potential donor) for assistance, either
physical or monetary. Suppose the recipient can decide not only what kind of
help she wants, but also how much. Neglecting mixed gifts, the recipient thus
chooses the size of the gift ˜ g ∈ R+ and the type of gift i ∈{ m,t}. Implicit in
our formulation is the assumption that the donor cannot respond to a request
by giving a positive but smaller gift, or even a larger gift than requested.
(Unless the request restricts the donor’s options, the model does not provide
a role for requests.)
In order to understand the trade–oﬀ facing the uninformed recipient, we
ﬁrst analyze the donor’s decision in the face of a modest request.
Observation 5 There is a nonempty set of positive requests that are granted
by both types of donor.
11It is tempting to conclude that the propensity to give non-monetary gifts should be
everywhere increasing in ωR.H owever, such a monotonicity result appears to require addi-
tional assumptions regarding the functional forms of f as well as r.
12For example, the donor will grant any monetary request smaller than ¯ gm
P ,
deﬁned as the solution to
d(ωD + ¯ t − ¯ g
m
P )+αLr(ωR +¯ g
m
P )+p(ˆ α)=d(ωD + ¯ t)+αLr(ωR)+p(αL). (7)
Intuitively, the egoist prefers to pay the cost of helping and getting some
average level of pride p(¯ α)t ob eing exposed as an egoist and getting the level
of pride p(αL).12 Note that ¯ gm
P is the largest monetary request that both donor
types agree to. Let ¯ gt
P be the corresponding maximal time request.
Faced with an immodest request, the donor’s problem is diﬀerent.
Observation 6 There is a non–empty set of requests that are granted by the
altruistic donor but not by the selﬁsh donor.
The observation follows immediately from Lemmas 1 and 2. In particular, a
monetary request of gm
S or slightly larger, or a non–monetary request of gt
S or
slightly larger will be granted by the altruist but not by the egoist. Let us say
that a request is modest if it is granted by both types of donor.
Proposition 3 (i) Egoistic donors dislike all requests. (ii) Altruistic donors
dislike modest requests, but will like some immodest requests if the recipient’s
expectations are not too optimistic.
To an egoist, any request “puts him on the spot.” Esteem cannot be gained in
equilibrium, since any request that is acceptable to the egoist is also acceptable
to the altruist. The choice is between giving and maintaining the recipient’s
prior and not giving and losing esteem. The altruist dislikes modest requests
since they are not associated with gains in esteem. However, the altruist
may like an immodest request. If the recipient is suﬃciently pessimistic, the
altruistic donor will be happy about any request slightly exceeding gS.13 Such
a request provides a valuable opportunity to gain esteem. On the other hand,
the altruistic donor dislikes to be taken for granted, as when ˆ h is large, since
there is little scope for gaining additional esteem.
12More formally, only pooling at the requested gift satisﬁes D1, because (i) there are no
separating equilibria and (ii) the pooling equilibrium in which both types refuses to give fails
D1. The proof of the latter assertion runs as follows. If both types refuse, it must be because
the recipient holds relatively pessimistic beliefs in case the donor acquiesces. However, since
there is a larger set of recipient out–of–equilibrium beliefs that justify an upward deviation
by the altruistic donor than by the egoistic donor, the supposed pessimistic beliefs violate
D1.
13The proof runs as follows. When ˆ h tends to zero, the diﬀerence between p(αH) and p(ˆ α)
tends to p(αH)−p(αL), and since the egoist is just indiﬀerent between giving 0 and gS, the
altruist strictly prefers giving gS.
134.1 Recipient’s type is known
We assume that the recipient’s utility can be written
uj = r(cR)+αjd(cD) − eR(αj)fR(g
t)+p(ˆ α). (8)
The recipient’s utility function exactly parallels that of the donor and justiﬁ-
cations are the same as above.
Assume to begin with that the recipient is egoistic, with αR = αL is close
to zero and that this is known to the donor. Since the uninformed recipient
has the ﬁrst move, the situation is essentially a screening problem, but one
where the second mover’s decision is driven by signaling concerns.
Let ¯ gm
S be the largest request that an altruistic donor will grant in any
equilibrium. Formally, ¯ gm
S is given as the solution to the equation
d(ωD +¯ t− ¯ g
m
S )+αHr(ωR +¯ g
m
S )+p(αH)=d(ωD +¯ t)+αHr(ωR)+p(αL). (9)
Relative to the outcome under donor initiative, an egoistic recipient always
prefers to ask for larger and (weakly) more liquid gifts.
Observation 7 A recipient who is known to be egoistic will ask for ¯ gm
P if
¯ gm
P ≥ ˆ h¯ gm
S and for ¯ gm
S otherwise.
That is, an egoistic recipient requests either the largest monetary gift that the
egoistic donor is willing to give or the largest monetary gift that the altruistic
donor is willing to give. The choice between the two requests hinges on the
belief ˆ h.
4.2 Recipient private information
Let us now turn to the more interesting case in which the recipient may be
altruistic and the recipient’s type is privately known.
Note ﬁrst that the single–crossing condition is satisﬁed for the recipient.
More precisely, for given donor beliefs and behavior, the altruistic recipient has
more to gain (less to lose) by reducing the requested gift than does the egoistic
recipient. Therefore, we can conﬁne attention to the least costly separating
equilibrium for the donor.
From Observation ??,w eknow that the selﬁsh recipient will ask for money,
either ¯ gm
P or ¯ gm
S . Suppose for now that h is large enough to make ¯ gm
S the egoistic




S ;αL)=r(ωR +¯ g
m
S + αLd(ωD + ¯ t − ¯ g
m
S ).
14If requesting money, the altruistic recipient ask for the gift ˆ qm
S that just
prevents the egoistic recipient from mimicking,
uR(¯ g
m
S ;αL)=r(ωR +ˆ q
m
S )+αLd(ωD + ¯ t − ˆ g
m
S )+p(αH). (10)
That is, by making a small enough request, the recipient convincingly signals
altruism, and is paid esteem.





S ;αL)=r(ωR + γˆ q
t
S)+αLd(ωD + ¯ t − ˆ g
t
S) − e(αL)fR(ˆ q
t
S)+p(αH). (11)
Note that ˆ qt
S > ˆ gm
S . Thus, the advantage associated with asking for the donor’s
time is that the gift can be increased without attracting mimickry by the
egoist. Since all these arguments hold equally well when h is so small that the
recipient prefers to induce a pooling equilibrium among donor types, we have
the section’s main result.
Proposition 4 Suppose the recipient’s type is privately known. Then, in the
unique Intuitive equilibrium outcome the egoistic recipient requests a monetary
gift, whereas the altruistic recipient requests either a smaller monetary gift or
an intermediate time gift.
Psychologists have shown that people tend to like others whom they have
helped. Jecker and Landy (1969) is a seminal study. The authors had students
participate in an experiment where they earned money. Afterwards, one third
of the subjects were approached by the experimenter who explained that he
was using his own funds for the experiment and was running short, meaning
that he may have to stop the experiment before its planned completion. He
asked: “As a special favor to me, would you mind returning the money you
won?” Another third of the students were approached by the department’s
secretary, who asked them if they would return the money as as a special favor
to the psychology department’s research fund, which was running low. The
remaining participants were not asked to return their winnings. Afterwards,
all the subjects ﬁlled out a questionnaire where, among other things, they had
an opportunity to state their feelings about the experimenter. The students
who had been approached by the experimenter directly liked him best. Jecker
and Landy’s explanation, endorsed by Aronson (2004), is that helpers seek
to justify their action ex post. “Because I answered the request for help, the
person must have been deserving.” To economists, this reasoning is awkward,
as we assume preferences to drive behavior and not the other way around. Our
model suggests that interpersonal liking may or may not increase following a
request for help, depending on how “personal” the request and the helping
15activity are. Although in Jecker and Landy’s case the experimenter asked for
money, he did so in a highly personal way. Therefore, he was making a sacriﬁce
too. To distinguish experimentally between the two hypotheses is relatively
straightforward. If we are right, the liking for the experimenter will be sensitive
to how personal the request is. If the psychologists are right, only the content
of the request matters.
5 Extensions and Discussion
For simplicity we have focussed throughout on the case in which altruism is so
modest that the least altruistic donors give nothing in a separating equilibrium.
However, all the important insights remain when altruism is so great that both
typeso fdonor give positive amounts. The only diﬀerence is that when the least
altruistic donors give a positive amount, they always give money; since they
do not get the esteem beneﬁt, there is no point for them in making a non–
monetary donation. This observation is consistent with Waldfogel’s (2002)
observation that cash gifts sometimes carry a stigma; the cash gift reveals the
donor’s relatively low altruism.
Another extension of the model is to allow a continuum of possible levels
of altruism. However, there appears to be something wrong with mechanically
assuming separating equilibria: In reality, we doubt that the gift size varies
continuously so as to signal the donor’s altruism exactly. Instead, it seems
to us that gifts often come in certain conventional sizes. To capture this
phenomenon, the equilibrium would have to be (at least partially) pooling.
We shall now turn to a set of arguments that suggest how pooling may come
about.
5.1 Social regulation
The social norms concerning gift giving have sometimes been subjected to
considerable public debate. This is natural; many people are both donors and
recipients, and to the extent that gift giving is socially wasteful, society has an
incentive to regulate it. For example, Zelitzer (1994, p79) describes how “At
the turn of the twentieth century, as their gift exchanges multiplied, Ameri-
cans, contemplated, debated, and publicly deﬁned gift transfers.” One way to
interpret social regulation is as coordination of expectations on a particular
equilibrium, for example one that maximizes a weighted sum of utilities for
donors and recipients. And in this case, the fully separating equilibrium may
do quite poorly. For example, all donor types might sometimes be better oﬀ
in the pooling equilibrium where no gift is given: In our two–type model, this
16happens when h is close to 1; see Mailath, Okuno–Fujiwara and Postlewaite
(1993) for a belief–based argument in favor of selecting this equilibrium. On
their side, recipients in our model typically prefer equilibria in which an aver-
age gift is always given to equilibria in which the gift is sometimes large and
sometimes small. Thus, equilibria with relatively uniform gifts can be desirable
for recipients and (many) donors alike.14
When it comes to the nature of the gift, we have shown that donors often
favor non–monetary gifts. By contrast, recipients always favor cash gifts, as
cash gifts are both larger and more useful. If both parties know at the outset
that the occasion calls for a donation, as for example in the case of a marriage
where the guests know that the couple expects gifts, we would expect the
balance to be tilted less strongly in favor of non–monetary gifts than indicated
by our donor–focused analysis.
5.2 The compensation taboo
In many places, there are taboos against paying cash for neighborly help; see
for example Webley and Lee (1993). Likewise, we usually don’t pay colleagues
and friends for their assistance. The model straightforwardly explains the
opposition to such payments. If the recipient makes a positive cash payment,
the altruistic donor will have to increase the gift so as to maintain separation.
Having done so, the donor’s utility is roughly the same as it would have been
without the payment. The recipient, however, is worse oﬀ, because due to the
ineﬃciencies associated with the transaction the additional help is worth less
than the cash payment.15
The main exception to the compensation taboo is when part of the donor’s
costs are monetary and part is non–monetary; monetary costs can be reim-
bursed without inducing ineﬃciency. Presumably, this is why famous people
(including leading academics) are often asked to contribute their time to vari-
ous causes while being compensated only for their lodging and travel costs.
Another exception may be the case in which the non–monetary task is
indivisible and “to large.” By paying some partial compensation, the recipient
gets the value of the non–monetary gift down below the critical level ¯ gt.
14We here eschew attempts to characterize formally the equilibria that would be imple-
mented by some social contract, but we conjecture that the problem can be formulated and
solved along the lines proposed by Myerson (1985).
15Sometimes, cash payments allegedly even decrease non–monetary donations, a phe-
nomenon that is sometimes referred to as “motivational crowding out.” Our model cannot
explain motivational crowding out. To do so, the model would need, for example, multi–
dimensional characteristics (as in B´ enabou and Tirole, 2006), or private information about
the recipient’s type (as in Ellingsen and Johannesson, 2006a).
17We have assumed so far that the donor and recipient both understands
which equilibrium is being played, and that the donor has no opportunity to
ﬁne–tune the magnitude of the gift following a request. In reality, situations
may be more opaque. Think about the embarassments that result when donors
and recipients have diﬀerent expectations: The recipient after being helped
takes out the wallet and wants to pay. Suppose the helper had been happy
about the opportunity to prove his altruism (a separating equilibrium). The
payment indicates that the recipient’s request had been intended as a modest
request (pooling equilibrium). If so, taking the money implies that the helper
has been used — small requests don’t pay esteem. Therefore, it may be better
to refuse the money and insist that one never even had a thought that money
would be paid. If the recipient agrees not to pay, the altruistic helper is happy.
However, the very possibility that a helper refuses money is detrimental to
modest requests. The egoist may suspect that a refusal to accept money is
anticipated, and thus decline to provide help altogether.
6 Conclusion
Becker (1974) emphasized that the quest for social esteem is a major determi-
nant of altruistic behavior. Yet, he opted for a parsimonious model without
esteem considerations, as did Andreoni (1989).
We think that generous behaviour is often a matter of symbolic social
exchange. The gift is a signal, and the payment is esteem.
Introducing concerns for social esteem into Becker’s framework helps to
explain symbolic giving in general and ineﬃcient non–monetary giving in par-
ticular. Camerer (1988) ﬁrst proved the point for bilateral giving, and Prender-
gast and Stole (2001) (building on an idea by Camerer) proved it for unilateral
giving when altruistic donors have better information about the recipient’s
preferences than do egoistic donors.
To summarize the contribution of our paper, consider the following exam-
ple, due to Camerer (1988, page S193-194)
When my friend surprises me with an obscure H¨ usker D¨ u recording,
he reveals his knowledge of my tastes (along with his willingness to
invest) with an eﬃcient gift. His gifts are guesses about what I like,
and sometimes these guesses will be wrong; gifts will be ineﬃcient.
This occasional ineﬃciency cannot be avoided by asking me what
I like, because even a casual friend could do that. A close friend
must guess at my tastes (and sometimes err) to distinguish himself
from a casual friend.
18Prendergast and Stole (2001) formalizes exactly this argument. Our model
suggests why the obscure H¨ usker D¨ u recording works ﬁne as a present even
if the friend has asked ﬁrst — indeed even if Camerer writes it on his wish
list. Rare recordings are, by their nature, hard to track down. The friend
has to trawl the record shops (remember, this was 1988, before everything
could be found on the internet). Unless the friend is a record collector, doing
so is painful. However, for a truly close friend, the pain is mitigated by the
pleasurable thought of handing the present to a dear friend.
Our argument applies beyond gift giving as we normally think of it. Con-
dider courtesy. Right now, we would like to make courteous remarks about
previous literature, demonstrating that we understand and like it. However,
conventional praise is cheap. (Besides, grading of others’ work is considered
bad style.) According to the model of Prendergast and Stole (2001), we ought
to prove our appreciation by writing something insightful about it. The pre-
vious paragraph is one attempt, but we go further. We have carefully checked
H¨ usker D¨ u’s lyrics for a useful quote with which to end the paper. To our
satisfaction, a line on their last studio album, Warehouse: Songs and Stories
(1987), perfectly captures our explanation for generous behavior: A man has
two reasons for the things that he does. The ﬁrst one is pride and the second
one is love.
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